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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants do not dispute the affidavit of Karla Winkler,
which states that the Industrial Commission did not receive written
notice.

The defendants cannot disregard clear statutory language

and create a procedure contrary to the Utah Code Ann. §35-143(3) (b).

To allow them to do that would allow defendants to

create legislation.

That is the role of the legislature and not

the Industrial Commission or the judiciary.

When the legislature

changed the statute in 1995 to read the way the defendants want the
old

statute

to

be

interpreted

legislature did its job.

is

clear

evidence

that

the

However, the new statute cannot be

applied retroactively because the new statute does not clarify how
the earlier statute should have been understood and retroactive
application would grant defendants' greater rights and it would
impose greater liability upon the applicants.

Lastly, defendants

claim that public policy dictates that Mr. Olsen's family be
deprived of his death benefits because they will be at odds with
the employer about coverage.

Defendants cite no cases in support

of this claim, and, contrary to defendants' claim, declaratory
actions are frequently
insurance

company

interpretation.

have

filed when either the insured or the
a dispute

that

relates

to

statutory

Also, because defendants freely admit that they

disregarded the requirement that written notice be sent to the
Industrial Commission their public policy claim is ineffectual.

1

REPLY POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-43(3) (b) REQUIRES WRITTEN
NOTICE AND IT WAS NOT GIVEN. THE DEFENDANTS DO
NOT HAVE THE POWER TO REWRITE THE STATUTE AT
THEIR CONVENIENCE AND DISREGARD THE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE.
A. KARLA WINKLER'S AFFIDAVIT THAT THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION DID NOT RECEIVE WRITTEN NOTICE IS UNCHALLENGED
In the defendants' Point I, they cite RDG Assoc. /Jorman Corp.
v. Indus, Com'n. 741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 1987), which states that,
"proper construction of a statute must further its purposes."
However, the defendants fail to say what the purpose of the Utah
Workers'

Compensation

Act

is.

The Utah

Supreme

Court

has

unequivocally stated:
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed
liberally to further the statutory purposes of providing
relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents. . .
. The Industrial Commission is in the first instance
responsible for effectuating the purposes of the Act by
construing its provisions to secure its humane
objectives. (Cite omitted).
Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby. 678 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1984) . The
statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b), states that
the corporation "shall serve written notice upon its insurance
carrier and upon the commission . . . "

otherwise the officer or

director is still considered an employee. (Emphasis added).

In

this case, the employer did not serve written notice upon the
Commission.

It is uncontested that Karla Winkler's affidavit,

which states, " [a]ccording to our files & [sic] to the best of my
knowledge the Industrial Commission has not received a corporation
2

exclusion form on Samuel Mcintyre

[sic] Investments"

(R. 30),

establishes that an employer must file a corporation exclusion form
with the Commission and it was not filed.

The Fund's sending a

computer tape does not satisfy the clear and unambiguous language
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3) (b) . What is noticeably lacking in
the defendants brief

is any reply or even a comment to Ms.

Winkler's affidavit.

Because Mr. Olsen's request to the Fund did

not satisfy the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. §35-143(3)(b), he was, therefore, still considered an employee of the
corporation.
Defendants also claim that notice is for the benefit of the
party who is to receive the notice. This is simply not true under
the Worker's Compensation Act. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-97(2) requires
an employee to give the employer or the Commission notice of an
injury within 180 days of the injury or the employee is barred from
any claim of benefits.

However, §35-1-97(4) (a) also requires the

employer to give notice of an accident to the Industrial Commission
within seven days of any of the following: a) the occurrence of the
injury; b) the employer's first knowledge of the injury; or c)
after the employee's notification of injury to the employer.

The

notice the employer must give to the Industrial Commission neither
tolls the statute of limitations for the employee's benefit nor can
it be used as a defense by the employer, if the employer fails to
give the notice.

(See,

Kennecott Corp. V. Industrial Comm'n. 740

P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987).

For whatever reason, the legislature

requires the employer to give the Commission notice of every injury
3

and death arising out of and in the course of employment.

This

notice does not benefit either the Industrial Commission or the
employee.

Likewise, the legislature required, in Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-43 (3) (b) , that the employer give written notice to the
Commission when an officer or director was no longer covered by
compensation insurance.

Until this written notice is given the

officer or director is considered an employee.
The defendants

also claim that because

the notification

requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-47 and 31A-22-1002 were met,
that somehow the written notice of §35-1-43 (3) (b) was also met.
Defendants fail to point out, however, that the notice requirements
of §§35-1-47 and 31A-22-1002 do not require written notice, which
is required in §35-1-43 (3) (b) .

Essentially, the defendants are

trying to bootstrap the required written notice of §35-1-43(3) (b)
onto two different statutes that require different types of notice.
The legislature used different language for the different statutes
and despite compliance with §§35-1-47 and 31A-22-1002, this Court,
"must assume 'that each term in the statute was used advisedly;
thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading
is unreasonably confused or inoperable.'" . . . (Cites omitted and
emphasis added) . Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P. 2d 74, 79-80 (Utah App.
1994).

As pointed out in applicants' first brief and it was not

disputed in defendants' brief, the reading of Utah Code Ann. §35-143(3) (b) is not unreasonably confused or inoperable.

Therefore,

written notice had to be given by the employer to the Industrial
Commission and computer tapes sent by the Fund to the Commission do
4

not satisfy that requirement. Therefore, defendants' argument that
notice was given must fail.
Defendants' next claim that Ms. Olsen and her three children
are using the statute as a sword instead of a shield and that to
grant benefits would be akin to allowing the fox to police the
henhouse.
offensive.

Both

of these

There

is

arguments

absolutely

misrepresentation by the employer.

are very misleading and

no

evidence

of

fraud

or

Defendants' statement implies

that Mr. Olsen gave the Fund notice and then went out and
intentionally got run over by a train so that his family could have
benefits.

Defendants' argument also implies that officers and

directors have given notice with the intent to get injured.
Defendants' argument borders on the absurd.
On the other hand, the Fund was perfectly capable of "policing
the henhouse" and simply failed to do so. The Fund admits that it
never observed the requirement of giving written notice to the
Industrial Commission (Defendants' Brief p. 12) and it may have
done this as many as 26,500 times. (R. 63)

This is remarkable

admission of neglect, because the Fund has an entire department of
legal

counsel,

the

Fund

only

provides

worker's

compensation

insurance, and the Fund is the largest workers' compensation
carrier in the state. The Fund had 26,500 opportunities to see to
it that the statutory requirements were met and the Fund freely
admits that it never observed the statutory requirement of written
notice to the Commission.

All the Fund had to do is ask the

employer to send a copy of the Industrial Commission's written
5

notice to the Fund or it would continue to charge the employer a
premium.

Or, the Fund could have simply called the Industrial

Commission and asked if a corporation exclusion form had been
received.

If the Commission had not received one,

then the Fund

could inform the employer that premiums will continue.

Instead,

the Fund chose to disregard the clear language of the statute and
to stop collecting premiums without any assurance that the statute
was complied with.

The Fund does not seem to understand that

noncompliance with Utah Code Ann. 35-1-43(3) (b) has a direct impact
on them as well as on the officer or director. The Fund was in the
best position to "police the henhouse" and the Fund not only failed
to do so, but wilfully chose not to on every occasion.
B. Strict Statutory Requirements Are Not "Absurd"
Unless One Party Wilfully Disregards Them and Defendants
Did Not Reasonable Rely On The Employees Notice
As shown in applicants' first brief and above, the plain and
clear language of §35-1-43(3) (b) requires written notice be given
to both the insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission,
otherwise the corporate officer is still considered an employee.
Nevertheless, the fact that the employer gave notice to the Fund
and not the Industrial Commission does not create an "absurd"
result.

In Lamarr v. Utah State DOT, 828 P.2d 535 (UtahApp. 1992)

this Court ruled that a plaintiff must give notice to UDOT and the
Attorney General's office, even though the Attorney General is
counsel for UDOT. Id. at 541. In fact, the court in Lamarr cited,
in footnote 6, a Utah Federal District court decision, which
states:
6

The court agrees with the defendants that the plain
meaning of section 63-30-12 requires that two notices of
claim should have been filed by plaintiff: one to the
Attorney General and one to the University of Utah.
Although this statutory requirement may result in
redundant notice being given, such redundancy apparently
is mandated by the statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney
General is the agent and legal counsel for all state
agencies, including the University of Utah.
In this
pendant state law claim, the court is unwilling to ignore
the unambiguous language of the Utah statute requiring
two separate notices, especially where the Utah Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that strict compliance with the
notice of claim provision is essential to maintain a suit
pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act.
(Emphasis
added)
Kavwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445, 1446-7 (D.Utah
1990).

Although the above case involves a different statute, the

legal principle is the same. The legislature requires that notice
be given to two entities even though it appears to be redundant.
In the case at hand, the legislature mandated notice be given
to both the Fund and the Industrial Commission otherwise the
decedent would still be considered an employee.

Failure to give

notice to two entities, even if it appears to be redundant, is not
"absurd."

What is absurd is the Fund admitting that it has never

followed the statutory directive and it now asks this Court to
create a remedy for the Fund because the Fund disregarded the
statutory requirements.
The defendants also claim that Mr. Olsen's family should be
denied his death benefits because of equitable estoppel. The Utah
Supreme Court stated, in Warren v. Provo City Corp. 838 P. 2d 1125,
1130 (Utah 1992) (footnote 16), that a party, "claiming an estoppel
cannot rely on representations or acts . . . if he had the means by
which with reasonable

diligence he could ascertain
7

the true

situation." (citations omitted).

The Fund cannot claim estoppel

because the Fund knew the true situation.

Moreover, the Fund

admittedly chose to disregard the language of the statute and by
doing so, helped create the situation that it now asks this court
to deliver it from.

It is startling that the Fund can claim

estoppel when it knew full well that Mr. Olsen was considered an
employee until the Commission received written notice. Therefore,
the

Industrial

reversed

and

Commission's
the

ALJ's

order

order

granting

reinstated,

review
which

should
grants

be
the

decedent's family death benefits.

REPLY POINT

II

THE STATUTORY CHANGES CANNOT BE RETROACTIVELY
APPLIED
BECAUSE
IT
WOULD GIVE
DEFENDANTS
GREATER RIGHTS AND IMPOSE GREATER LIABILITY ON
THE APPLICANTS

Defendants claim t h a t the new s t a t u t e should be r e t r o a c t i v e l y
applied in t h i s case.

Again, Utah law i s very c l e a r on t h i s i s s u e .

In Kennecott Corp. v. Indus. Com'n of Utah, 740 P. 2d 305 (Utah App.
1987), t h i s Court s t a t e d , " [ l ] a t e r s t a t u t e s or amendments may not
be applied

retroactively

to deprive a p a r t y

rights

or

impose

g r e a t e r l i a b i l i t y unless the l a t e r s t a t u t e or amendment c l a r i f i e s
or amplifies how the e a r l i e r law should have been understood."
at 308.

Id.

If t h i s Court were to apply the s t a t u t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y then

i t would deprive Mr. Olsen's family of r i g h t s and the s t a t u t e does
not

clarify

or amplify

how the
8

earlier

law should have been

understood.

None of the cases cited by defendants discuss the

workers' compensation statutes, like the Kennecott case does.
Consequently,

the

cases

cited

by

defendants

are

inapposite.

Moreover, the cases cited by defendants all agree that a statute
cannot be applied retroactively if it deprives a party rights or
imposes greater liability.

As shown above, that is exactly what

the defendants want this court to do: to apply that statute
retroactively so that the defendants have greater rights and the
applicants are deprived of theirs.

Therefore, defendants' second

argument must fail and the Industrial Commission's order must be
overturned.
Moreover, the fact that the legislature changed the statute is
a solid indication that it is the legislature's role to make that
change and not the judiciary's or the defendants.

In fact, the

defendants implicitly concede that written notice was necessary and
not given when they state, M[t]his amendment was clearly intended
to eliminate the requirement to give notice to the Commission,
either directly or indirectly.1'

(Defendant's brief, p. 11). The

statute in question requires written notice from the employer.
Only if the statute has not been satisfied, such as in the present
case, can "indirect11 notice by computer tape be claimed.

The

Industrial Commission followed the defendants' erroneous argument
when

it concluded

satisfies

that

the statutory

indirect

notice via

requirement

a computer tape

of written notice.

The

Commission erred because, "courts are not to infer substantive
terms into the text that are not already there.
9

Rather, the

interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court
has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not
expressed." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah
1994) . Although that language is addressed to district courts, the
Industrial Commission does not have power to legislate either.
The defendants also argue that the Fund and the Commission
have established an accepted procedure of notice through the
computer tape. Again, this claim ignores Ms. Winkler's affidavit.
Besides, the defendants are admitting that the Fund and the
Commission have rejected the legislature's requirement and have
established their own procedure.

In Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n,

790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1990), this Court stated, M[t]he Industrial
Commission

is

not

free

to

'legislate'

in

areas

apparently

overlooked by our lawmakers or to exercise power not expressly or
impliedly granted to it by the legislature, even in the name of
fairness." Id. at 578 (emphasis added).

The Industrial Commission

and the Fund cannot totally disregard the statutory requirement of
written notice.

If this Court affirms the Industrial Commission's

order, then such a decision would give the Industrial Commission
and the Fund the power to alter any statutory language at their
convenience. Therefore, defendants' argument is without merit and
the Commission's decision must be reversed.

10

REPLY POINT III
DEFENDANTS7 PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT IS MERITLESS
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS WILFULLY DISREGARDED THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN NOTICE
Lastly, the defendants claim that public policy dictates that
Mr.

Olsen's

family be denied

death benefits.

This would

be

inconsistent with Utah law, which states:
While such an approach may occasionally result in
decisions that seem harsh or unfair, it is for the
legislature, not the judiciary, to remedy such results by
amending or repealing the statute. Indeed, "if the act
is unjust, amendments to correct the inequities should be
made
by
the
legislature
and
not
by
judicial
interpretation." Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref.
& Mining Co. , 113 Utah 101, 126, 191 P.2d 612, 625,
appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 93 L. Ed. 411, 69 S. Ct.
138 (1948); see also Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775
P.2d 348, 377 (Utah 1989) (Hall, C.J., dissenting). ("It
is not our prerogative to question the wisdom, social
desirability, or public policy underlying a given
statute.
Those are matters left exclusively to the
legislature's judgment and determination."); Utah Mfrs.'
Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 204, 23 P.2d 229, 232
(1933)(Fairly debatable questions as to reasonableness,
wisdom, or propriety [of legislative action] are not for
the courts but for the Legislature.") ; . . . . (Citations
omitted and emphasis added).
White v. Deseelhorst.

879 P.2d

1371, 1378

Russon's dissenting opinion, footnote 2 ) .

(Utah 1994) (Justice
The defendants state

that, "if Olsen were found to be an employee . . . the Fund would
be placed in the position of having to dispute coverage under the
plan

rather

than

guarding

the

11

interest

of

the

Employer."

(Defendants' brief, p. 12)1.

This claim is completely meritless.

What defendants' are essentially arguing is that statutory language
that directly impacts a contract must be disregarded, otherwise the
parties will

have

a dispute

about

the

contract.

Insurance

companies routinely deny coverage and base the denial on statutory
language.

Then either the insurance company or the insured file a

declaratory action to determine if there is coverage or not.
Ofttimes if an insurance company wins the declaratory action, then
insured is exposed to liability or excess liability.

See, Wagner

v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P. 2d 763 (Utah App. 1990) . In following
the Fund's logic, then anytime an insured and the insurance company
have a dispute over coverage that is affected by statute, then as
a matter of public policy the statute must be ignored so there is
no interference with the contract. Defendants do not cite a single
case in support of this unfounded position and it is meritless.
See, Neel v. State, 889 P. 2d 922 (Utah 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987).

In the present

case, the defendants ignored the statute, knowing that Mr. Olsen
would still be considered an employee, and now want this Court's
help because they claim it may affect their contract with the
employer.
The defendants also try to create a sense of panic by claiming
that if this Court decides that the Fund is liable in this case,

The applicants question defendants' claim that if Mr. Olsen was found
to be an employee, then the dispute between the Fund and the employer would create
a situation that violates public policy. The fact that the Fund's legal counsel
still represents both the employer and the Fund makes this claim questionable at
best.

12

then the Fund is potential liability for thousands of claims.
Also, the public would not be served if this occurs because there
could be thousands of lawsuits.

This is absurd.

First, because

the statute was amended in 1995 (more than VA years ago) any claim
that may be raised must first get past the statute of limitations.
Consequently, a'ny claim for death benefits under the old statute is
wholly barred because such a claim must be filed within one year of
the employee's death.

Also, if the director or officer did not

report the injury to the employer within 180 days of the injury
then any claim for benefits is wholly barred. Any claim more than
six years old is also wholly barred if the employee did not file a
claim with the Industrial Commission within six years.

The Fund

did not present any evidence to the Industrial Commission that
additional claims have been filed or even would be filed. The Fund
is

asking

this

Court

to

make

a

decision

based

upon

pure

speculation, which "violates the basic premise upon which our
judicial system is founded."

Willey v. Willey. 914 P. 2d 1149,

1151 (Utah App. 1996).
Furthermore, if anyone were successful in getting past the
statute of limitations, then the Fund would only have to collect
past premiums from those employers.

Additionally, the more time

that passes the smaller the risk. What is truly ironic is that the
defendants candidly admit that they wilfully disregarded clear
statutory requirements, perhaps as many as 26,500 times, which
directly put defendants this situation, and now they ask this Court
to bail them out because public policy dictates it.
13

Applicants

fail to see how defendants misfeasance can protect the public and
promote public interest. Therefore, the defendants' argument is
meritless and the Industrial Commission's order must be overturned
and the ALJ's order reinstated.

CONCLUSION
The

Industrial

Commission's

order

that

states

that

the

computer tape satisfies the written notice requirement of Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-43 (3) (b) is erroneous.

To allow that order to stand

would give power to the defendants to rewrite statutes at their
convenience.

Utah law simply does not allow the Industrial

Commission and the Fund to legislate. The legislature has changed
the statute, which is the legislative role, not the judiciary's.
Utah law does not allow a statute to be applied retroactively if
greater rights are given or if others are deprived of theirs, which
would happen in the case at hand.

The defendants' admission that

they never observed the statutory requirement, not only in this
case, but in as many as 26,500 cases, defeats their argument that
the Commission's order should be upheld for public policy reasons.
Defendants

should be held accountable

for their misfeasance.

Therefore, the Industrial Commission's order must be overturned and
the ALJ's order reinstated, which orders the Fund to pay the death
benefits to Mr. Olsen's widow and their three children.
DATED this 24th day of October, 1996.

UGEtfE C. MILLER, J R . l ^
Atrornevs for Appellants/
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